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Abstract
In their paper, Nikogosian and Kickbusch show how the effects of the adoption by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) and its first Protocol 
extend beyond tobacco control and contribute to public health governance more broadly, by revealing new 
processes, institutions and instruments. While there are certainly good reasons to be optimistic about the 
impact of these instruments in the public health sphere, the experience of the FCTC’s implementation in the 
context of the European Union (EU) shows that further efforts are still necessary for its full potential to be 
realised. Indeed, one of the main hurdles to the FCTC’s success so far has been the difficulty in developing 
and maintaining comprehensive multisectoral measures and involving sectors beyond the sphere of public 
health. 
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The adoption by the World Health Organization (WHO) of the world’s first major international health treaty – the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC)1 – and later that of its first Protocol (the 
Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products),2 
was a major political and legal victory in the fight against the 
tobacco epidemic. Indeed, the FCTC marks the agreement of 
its 180 parties on the principles and objectives concerning the 
approach to take on tobacco control, and moreover sets them 
down in a binding legal form. In so doing, it provides a solid 
foundation for all Parties to build upon in order to protect 
citizens from the devastating health, social, environmental 
and economic consequences of tobacco consumption and 
exposure to tobacco smoke, as well as a body in which states 
are obligated to report their progress to, based on the FCTCs 
recommendations.
However, in their perspective titled “The Legal Strength of 
International Health Instruments – What It Brings to Global 
Health Governance?” Nikogosian and Kickbush convincingly 
argue that the impact of the adoption of the FCTC and its 
first Protocol extends even beyond the domain of tobacco 
control, and has consequences for public health regulation in 
general.3 Indeed, the authors contend that these instruments 
have “opened a new phase in WHO-global health that accepted 
internationally binding treaties as one major way forward and 
that they constituted a breakthrough by revealing new types of 
processes, institutions and instruments.” 
Although, as a public health expert and Director of the 
Smoke Free Partnership, I have regularly participated in the 
Conference of Parties and therefore have an international 
experience of FCTC negotiations, the major focus of my 
professional activity is primarily on its implementation at 
the level of the European Union (EU). This commentary will 
therefore show how some of the authors’ observations find 
confirmation to a great extent from the perspective of the 
implementation of the FCTC in the EU, while at the same time 
highlighting a central difficulty in ensuring the full efficacy of 
international health instruments such as the FCTC. Indeed, 
the benefits in terms of good public health governance and 
legislation postulated by the authors are often hampered by 
difficulties arising from a lack of multisectoral understanding 
of and action on the issues underpinning the FCTC. 
It is worth noting that, as the EU is the only supranational 
body capable of negotiating and being a party to the FCTC 
on behalf of its Member States, it provides a unique forum 
in which to examine the question of the FCTC’s impact, as it 
comes with its own very specific set of processes, institutions 
and instruments. 
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Progress Made and Impact at European Union Level
Prior to the ratification of the FCTC by the EU, the region 
was already among the forerunners of international tobacco 
control. Indeed, it first began regulating tobacco products 
as early as 1990 when it established minimum tar yields 
for cigarettes. Shortly after, this was complemented by the 
withdrawal of snus (tobacco for oral use) from the EU single 
market in 1992 following health concerns. However, the 
EU had been active in the field of tobacco control prior to 
these steps and during the 1980s and 1990s had introduced 
legislation governing smoke free workplaces, tobacco 
taxation, and tobacco advertising. In 2001, the EU adopted 
the first Tobacco Products Directive (TPD), which brought 
most of the existing tobacco product regulation under one 
legislative umbrella. The 2001 TPD strongly reflected the best 
available evidence at the time and marked a significant step 
forward for a number of Member States in the area of tobacco 
control. However, as scientific evidence continued to grow in 
the 2000s, it became clear that the 2001 TPD was becoming 
outdated. 
The revision process of the TPD provides a prime example of 
how the FCTC has been used as a foundational springboard 
for further, more stringent laws and practices at EU level. 
Thus, the accession of the EU to the FCTC, and especially the 
visit of the former Head of the Convention Secretariat to the 
European Commission in 2012, was instrumental in obtaining 
a successful outcome. Indeed, this served as an opportunity to 
remind several high-level officials from different departments 
within the Commission of the EU’s obligations under the 
FCTC and, consequently, the revision process produced an 
exemplary piece of legislation which aligns very closely with 
the Convention. 
Moreover, as noted in the commented article, examples of the 
policy-bolstering effects of the FCTC can also be observed 
at the national level, with several EU countries taking the 
initiative to go beyond the requirements of the Directive 
and adopt even stricter tobacco control laws, such as the 
plain packaging legislation introduced in Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, France, Hungary, and Slovenia.
Nevertheless, while the FCTC has been key to some crucial 
advances in tobacco control in the EU, significant efforts must 
still be made in terms of multisectoralism for the full benefits 
in terms of public health governance and regulation to take 
hold. 
Challenges Ahead
The WHO4 and the World Bank5 have identified the FCTC’s 
most effective measures which are supported by substantial 
evidence confirming their impact on reducing smoking 
prevalence.6-9 Furthermore, Article 4 of the FCTC calls on 
Parties to make a political commitment to develop and 
maintain comprehensive multisectoral measures (outside 
of the health sector), and to ensure the participation of civil 
society. Moreover, a global impact assessment report showed 
that Parties that have implemented multisectoral FCTC 
policies have generally experienced greater reductions in 
smoking prevalence.10 Indeed, in order to achieve a complete 
and effective tobacco control policy, the participation and 
collaboration of multiple sectors is necessary, as no single 
sector or agency can adequately address all elements of the 
FCTC. Thus, support of non-health sectors such as tax, 
customs, development, research, agriculture and trade is 
crucial, and the same is likely to be true for other public 
health policies. However, there is still some way to go in the 
EU for effective multisectoralism to be achieved. Whilst the 
EU is considered the global lead in tobacco tax policies, the 
implementation of Article 6 remains uneven and insufficient. 
A significant obstacle to the implementation of FCTC Article 
6 (tax) in the EU has been the difference in levels of taxation 
between European countries as well as differences in levels 
of taxation between tobacco product categories. Another 
significant obstacle is institutional: whilst national Health 
Ministries might understand the positive benefits of higher 
tobacco prices on consumption levels, excise duties for 
tobacco products are determined by Ministries of Finance. 
Unfortunately, there is often little or no communication 
between the Health and Finance Ministries, resulting in 
the latter having little understanding of how important 
tobacco taxation can be in curbing smoking levels, and little 
appreciation of the full social and economic costs of smoking. 
The last obstacle is the interference of the tobacco industry in 
taxation policy: the tobacco industry has a strong interest in 
convincing governments to pursue lower-tax policies and it 
therefore invests considerable lobbying energy in weakening 
or defeating tobacco tax proposals; a key argument is that 
tobacco tax increases will lead to rises in illicit trade in tobacco 
products, and a decline in tax revenues. The tobacco industry 
supports its false economic arguments by commissioning 
reports which are rarely peer reviewed, generally of a lower 
quality when compared to reports written by independent 
academics, and often biased.11-14 
Some Parties in the European region, such as the United 
Kingdom, France or the Ukraine15 have implemented Article 
6 (for consistency) successfully. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, in 1993, Kenneth Clarke MP was the first Chancellor 
to explicitly state that he intended to raise the tax on tobacco 
for health reasons, noting that it was “the most effective way 
to reduce smoking.” Since then, apart from the period 2001-
2008, successive UK governments have increased tobacco 
duties above the rate of inflation and the current commitment 
in place is for an escalation of 2% above inflation until 2020. 
Other successful examples include France, which began 
to substantially increase its tobacco tax in 1990, resulting 
in a three-fold increase in the inflation-adjusted price of 
cigarettes, and a reduction in cigarette consumption per adult 
per day of 50% (from about 6 to 3). Ukraine has also increased 
its excise taxes six times in 2010–2011 and increased revenues 
five times, along with a 26% decline in tobacco sales. 
At EU level, the European Commission (EC) is currently 
considering the revision of the Tobacco Tax Directive 
(TTD) which defines the product categories, structure and 
minimum rates for excise duties on manufactured tobacco. 
In order to assess if the TTD is still fit for purpose, the 
Commission carried out a series of reports and evaluations to 
review the entire stock of EU legislation – to identify burdens, 
inconsistencies, gaps or ineffective measures and to make 
the necessary proposals to follow up on the findings of the 
review; In this context, Article 6 remains the FCTC’s least 
well-implemented aspect,16 despite the adoption of the FCTC 
Article 6 Guidelines, which were unanimously agreed at the 
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6th Conference of the Parties in 2014. This could be considered 
surprising, as measures recommended under Article 6 have 
been consistently shown by hundreds of studies from countries 
around the world to be one of the most effective for tobacco 
control. These studies confirm that increasing excise taxes on 
tobacco, which leads to higher tobacco prices, is by far the 
most effective tobacco control instrument to prevent cancer 
and chronic diseases, as well as the uptake of smoking by 
young people, and to re-balance health inequalities as part of 
a comprehensive tobacco control strategy17-19; all the evidence 
shows that implementation of Article 6 is very effective at 
combatting tobacco, and, as we have seen above, the Parties 
that have done it have been very successful on that level; it is 
all the more surprising given that the EU and the 28 Member 
States have all ratified the FCTC and have committed (and 
are legally bound) to its implementation, and are under the 
obligation – both under primary20 and secondary21 EU law – 
to ensure that fiscal legislation on tobacco products such as 
the TTD achieves a high level of health protection. In the case 
of the TTD revision, whilst it is certainly true that the FCTC 
did, to some extent, improve communication and cooperation 
between several of the Commission departments concerned 
– such as DG TAXUD (tax) and DG SANTE (health) this 
has not yet been translated into the various documents that 
have been published so far. How then can the apparent lack of 
impact of the FCTC on the TTD revision, compared to that 
of the TPD, be explained? Part of the answer can perhaps be 
found in the fact that the representatives negotiating the text 
in the Council of Ministers on behalf of the Member States 
are not health professionals, but tax attachés with little or no 
understanding of its health implications and the FCTC, who 
tend to perceive tobacco taxation as a money making method 
rather than a public health priority. Thus, although one of the 
aims of the directive is to align with the objectives of the FCTC, 
this results on a weaker focus on public health. This example 
illustrates how, even at the level of the EC and EU Member 
States, the FCTC is still struggling to be fully understood by 
decision-makers outside of health departments and public 
health non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Conclusion 
If the principles and good practices contained in the FCTC 
are not reaching tax authorities and decision-makers outside 
of health departments, it will be difficult for international 
public health instruments do be developed and, perhaps 
more importantly, implemented successfully. A paradigm 
shift is definitely necessary for the dynamic that the FCTC 
has created to reach beyond the realm of tobacco control in 
a strict sense, as awareness on these issues has to be created 
from the bottom up. For this to happen, it is necessary for 
health departments in both the Member States and at EU 
level, as well as NGOs in the public health sector, to leave 
their comfort zone in order develop the necessary tools and 
contacts to communicate effectively with their counterparts 
in other areas of governance and create ownership of the 
principles contained in the FCTC within them. Only then will 
the conditions for new processes, institutions and instruments 
become fully possible and operational.
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